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Disturbing Trends in the Law of
Defamation: A Publishing
Attorney's Opinion
By

VICTOR

A. KOVNER*

Introduction
In the two years since Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,1 the press
has suffered a series of judicial setbacks throughout the nation. Although no single decision constitutes a radical departure from the Warren Court expansion of press freedoms, to any attorney counseling publishers the recent trend away from the principles of New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan2 seems ominous indeed. The gravity of this trend was
dramatically evidenced in March of this year by the conflicting opinions
of a divided Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Firestone.3 This commentary attempts to review the adverse implications of the principal defamation decisions affecting the press of the last two years.
The modern law of defamation began with New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan,4 which held that to recover for defamation a public official
had to establish with "convincing clarity" that the allegedly defamatory
material was published with "actual malice"; that is, with knowledge
of its falsity, or with reckless disregard as to its truth. The definition
of actual malice was further clarified in St. Amant v. Thompson5 to
require an "awareness of probable falsity," or evidence that the defendant actually "entertained serious doubts as to the truth" of the material
*
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Member, New York bar.
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
424 U.S. 448 (1976).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
390 U.S. 727 (1968).
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at the time of publication. In Curtis PublishingCo. v. Butts," the Court
extended the applicability of the Times standard to plaintiffs who were
"public figures."
The Supreme Court in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.7 extended the Times standard to private plaintiffs who were involved in
matters of public interest." The law applicable to this category of
claimants changed, however, in 1974 when Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.9 was decided by a five to four vote. Justice Blackmun provided
the swing vote, departing from the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom,
and concurring in Justice Powell's majority opinion in Gertz because:
[I]t is of profound importance for the Court to come to rest in the
defamation area and to have a clearly defined majority position
that eliminates the unsureness engendered by Rosenbloom's diversity. .0
In brief, the Supreme Court in Gertz: (a) excluded from the Times
rule statements about private persons involved in matters of public
interest, leaving the states to define the standards of liability in such
defamation claims so long as liability is not imposed without fault;
(b) limited recovery for defamation claims to actual damages (including pain and suffering, but not presumed or punitive damages)
in the absence of a showing of "actual malice"; and (c) reviewed the
"public figure" characterization, placing emphasis upon voluntary activities of the plaintiff, but recognizing the concept of an involuntary
public figure for limited purposes.
Aftermath of Gertz
The Adoption of Varying Standards of Defamation Liability
Most representatives of the press have found Gertz disturbing because of the latitude granted to the states to fix their own
standards of defamation liability (short of imposing strict liability)
where private individuals are involved in matters of public interest.
A preliminary review of the decisions of the states reveals a wide disparity in the standard selected. For instance, at least eight states have
6. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
7. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion).
8. In Rosenbloom, the Court applied the Times standard of liability to a distributor of nudist magazines who had been arrested for distributing allegedly obscene
material, and who had sued a radio station for failing to report that the material seized
was only "allegedly" obscene. Though not a public figure, the plaintiff was found to
have become involved in a matter of public interest. Id.
9. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
10. Id. at 3.54 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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selected a negligence standard, 1 while three' 2 have adopted the very
standard of the plurality in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.'3 Recently,

the New York Court of Appeals adopted a test of "gross irresponsibility," which requires, in effect, a showing of a gross departure from
ordinary journalistic standards where private individuals are involved

in matters of public interest.' 4
While New York's apparent middle ground may not seem too
burdensome for many publishers, what is most troubling is the inherent
consequences of a multiplicity of standards imposed upon any publication circulated outside its state of origin.' 5 The tendency of plaintiffs
to sue in forums with the least protective standards will influence the
legal advice given to publishers. Where the negligence standard is

presumed applicable, the publisher at press deadline may often become
unduly cautious.
Inadvertent Error as a Basis for Liability

The adverse implications of Gertz were not eased when the Supreme Court denied certiorari in several libel cases in the fall of 1975,
including Thomas H. Maloney & Sons, Inc. v. E. W. Scripps Co.16 In
Maloney the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment for the defendant newspaper which had published

an article about the inadvertent demolition of a building contiguous
to one scheduled for demolition. The article quoted Thomas Maloney
as saying, "I guess we got carried away." There was some doubt as
to whether anyone made such a statement. Thomas Maloney had retired from the plaintiff construction company, and the business was run

by his son, Timothy Maloney. Although the company and its principals
11. Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 543 P.2d 1356 (Hawaii 1975);
Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975); Gobin v. Globe Publishing
Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 330
N.E.2d 161 (Mass. 1975); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688
(Ct. App. 1976); Thomas H. Maloney & Sons, Inc. v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App.
2d 105, 334 N.E.2d 494 (1974), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 151 (1975); Martin v. Griffin
Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86
Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976).
12. Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 538 P.2d 450 (Colo.), cert. denied, 96
S. Ct. 469 (1975); Aafco Heating and Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publishing,
Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1975); LeBoeuf
v. Times Picayune Publishing Corp., 327 So. 2d 430 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
13. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
14. Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569,
379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975).
15. The existence of different standards in different jurisdictions inevitably will
lead to forum shopping and conflict of laws questions.
16. 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 334 N.E.2d 494 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883
(1975).
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would appear to have become "vortex public figures,'' having been
drawn into a matter of public interest by demolishing the wrong building, the Ohio court appears to have assumed they were private individuals and applied a negligence standard. The newspaper was forced to
bear the expense of a full-fledged trial over what appears to have been
at most an inadvertent error.
The potential exposure from inadvertent error was dramatized by
Time, Inc. v. Firestone." In Firestone, the following item in Time
magazine was the subject of the libel action:
DIVORCED. By Russell A. Firestone Jr., 41, heir to the tire
fortune: Mary Alice Sullivan Firestone, 32, his third wife; a onetime Palm Beach schoolteacher; on grounds of extreme cruelty
and adultery; after six years of marriage, one son; in West Palm
Beach, Fla. The 17-month intermittent trial produced enough
testimony of extramarital adventures
on both sides, said the judge,
9
"to make Dr. Freud's hair curl."'
The trial court in the divorce proceeding issued a confusing order
granting the husband's counterclaim for divorce, which alleged extreme
cruelty and adultery, and, in addition, awarding alimony to the plaintiff
wife. The Florida appellate courts subsequently held that because no
alimony could be granted as a matter of Florida law where there had
been a finding of adultery, the divorce must have been granted on
grounds of cruelty alone.
Mary Firestone contended that Time should have been aware of
the applicable Florida law and that no finding of adultery was actually
made by the trial court, notwithstanding its reference to "extra-marital
adventures on both sides

. . .

[sufficient] to make Dr. Freud's hair

curl."
At least six Supreme Court justices apparently assumed that the
Time publication was substantially false, notwithstanding Justice
Marshall's persuasive dissent in which he concluded that Time had
accurately reported the trial court's erroneous action. Significantly,
after conducting an investigation, Time had refused a request for retraction, insisting that the item was accurate. Although the concurrence of Justices Powell and Stewart made clear that insufficient evidence of fault on the part of Time had been offered to sustain liability
under Gertz, their tacit agreement that the material was, in fact, false
17. In Gertz, Justice Powell wrote: "Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare. For the most part
those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of
society." 418 U.S. at 345.
18. 424U.S. 448 (1976).
19. Id. at 452 (emphasis added).
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raises a serious question as to the extent to which liability may be imposed in the presence of substantial truth, as opposed to literal truth. 0
The Supreme Court's open and acknowledged change in defamation standards governing publication of material about private individuals involved in matters of public interest, as well as the Court's
more subtle shift to a requirement of literal truth, will have a practical
effect on the daily workings of the press. New questions are now being
asked: How much may a publisher rely on a reporter, even one who
is known and trusted, when an inadvertent error may subject the
publisher to liability? How much independent and corroborative investigation need be done? What constitutes the standard against
which a charge of negligence will be measured? The lack of clear
answers to these new questions will necessarily inhibit publication.
Apart from the enhanced risk of liability, 2 ' the cost alone of defending defamation claims can have a chilling effect. At one time (but
apparently no longer) this was recognized by the Supreme Court:
Fear of large verdicts in damage suits for innocent or merely negligent misstatement, even fear of the expense involved in their defense, must inevitably cause publishers to "steer ... wider of the
unlawful zone," and thus "create
the danger that the legitimate
22
utterance will be penalized.1
The expenses begin at the very early stages of litigation. Discovery proceedings are time-consuming, costly, and often subject a
reporter to various levels of intimidation. While these costs always
have had a deterring effect, the costs-and hence the chill-are greatly
enhanced when the claim is not dismissed by a motion for summary /
judgment and the publisher has to bear the expense of a trial.
Under the New York Times test, a case can be dismissed if, upon
motion, the plaintiff does not come forward with "clear and convincing"
evidence of "actual malice." Under a lesser standard a plaintiff frequently will be given the right to go to the jury for determination of a
question of fact, e.g., did the reporter or publisher follow proper standards of care or did he act negligently?
20. In contrast, the New York Court of Appeals in Chapadeau v. Utica ObserverDispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 200, 341 N.E.2d 569, 572, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 65 (1975),
found that a serious and acknowledged but inadvertant error should not give rise to
liability since "a limited number of typographical errors . . . are inevitable."
21. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) ($100,000); Montandon
v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 45 Cal. App. 3d 938, 120 Cal. Rptr. 186, cert. denied, 44
U.S.L.W. 3225 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1975) ($150,000).
22. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967) (emphasis added). The claim
was for invasion of privacy for casting the Hill family in a "false light"--a claim akin
to defamation.
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Both the negligence standard and any departure from the defense
of substantial truth offer the unscrupulous claimant or his attorney
leverage to force unreasonable settlements. Such demands are especially threatening when the publisher is too small to absorb the full
costs of asserting the First Amendment interests. As a result of Gertz
and Firestone, fear of litigation may force small newspapers and local
radio stations to withhold newsworthy material. The sacrifices will be
shared by their audiences in small communities throughout the country.
The Not-So-Private Lives of Elmer Gertz and Mary Alice Firestone

The stature of Elmer Gertz and his reputation in the Chicago
metropolitan area, as well as his role in the litigation against the Chicago
police, pose what many press .representatives believe to be a potentially more serious problem-deciding who is a "public figure." Although Justice Powell said that he did not intend to alter the definition
of "public figure," which had been developed in Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Butts,2" his opinion contained a footnote which cited the court of
appeals' questionable assumption that Gertz was not a public figure. 4
The fears generated by Gertz were borne out in Time, Inc. v.
Firestone.25 While Elmer Gertz was known in limited circles in Chicago, Mary Alice Firestone was widely known throughout Florida and
elsewhere, even to the point of notoriety. Mrs. Firestone had been
prominent in Palm Beach society for many years and her frequent appearances in the press prompted her to subscribe to a press clipping
service. Her seventeen-month divorce trial elicited forty-three articles
in the Miami Herald and forty-five articles in the Palm Beach newspapers. Clearly, she was involved in a controversy of interest to the
public. Moreover, during the trial she held several press conferences.
Because "access to the media" was considered a principal factor in
Gertz in determining public figure status, many assumed Mary Firestone was a public figure and that her defamation claim would require
evidence of "actual malice." Yet six justices of the Supreme Court
concluded that she was not a public figure, because not all controversies of interest to the public were "public controversies" within the
meaning of Gertz.26
The plurality opinion argued that dissolution of a marriage through
judicial proceedings
23. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
24. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 330 n.3 (1974). As Judge Brieant noted recently in Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 404 F. Supp. 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),

"[perhaps if attorney Gertz was not a public figure, nobody is." 404 F. Supp. at 1044.
25. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
26. ld. at 454.
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is not the sort of "public controversy" referred to in Gertz, even
though the marital difficulties of extremely wealthy27individuals may
be of interest to some portion of the reading public.
The Court downplayed her press conferences because they "should have

had no effect upon the merits of the legal dispute" with her husband
and there was "no indication that she sought to use the press conferences as a vehicle by which to thrust herself to the forefront of some

unrelated controversy in order to influence its resolution."28
In his dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the plurality, by making the test for public figure status be its own subjective evaluation of
the importance of the "public controversy," had placed itself in the
very dilemma Gertz sought to avoid-deciding which matters constituted a "public controversy" and which did not.29 The uncertainty

left by Firestone will undoubtedly deter countless editors throughout
the nation as they struggle to apply the latest interpretation of public
figure or public controversy.
Both Gertz and Firestone will infringe upon the publisher's decision-making process, since a higher standard of care must be applied
to private individuals. Inevitably, the names of some private individuals will be stricken from newsworthy stories, leaving the public figures
and public officials as the only persons identified.

Often these dele-

tions will tend to distort the news or the role of the public persons named.
The Use of Defamation Claims to Compel Disclosure of
Confidential Sources: Choice of Law and
Preclusion Problems
Most publishers' counsel will acknowledge that many defamation
27. Id.
28. Id. at n.3.
29. id. at 484 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In addition to curtailing the characterization of a "public figure," the Firestone opinion also rejected the publisher's argument
that reports of judicial proceedings were per se protected by the Times standard. Justice
Brennan's persuasive dissent in Firestone is addressed primarily to this issue. Also
troublesome is the fact that the Court held that damages for mental anguish and suffering could be sustained even in the absence of a claim for damages or for an injury to
reputation.
On a more positive note, the remand to the Florida courts for a determination of the
existence of fault must be seriously considered. Notwithstanding Justice Relmquist's
suggestion that fault may be found in the first instance at the appellate level, all of the
justices, with the exception of Justice White, who voted to affirm liability, implied that
there was inadequate evidence of fault. Justice Powell's concurring opinion warned that
unless there existed some basis for a finding of fault other than that given by the Supreme Court of Florida, there could be no liability. In view of the non-participation of
Justice Stevens, it appears that Firestonewill not constitute the final chapter in the law
of defamation for this Court.
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claimants are not seeking monetary damages. Claims are typically
asserted for some sort of vindication, such as retraction or the publication of an appropriate reply by the aggrieved party or his designee.
Another large portion of claimants simply serve a summons and complaint (sometimes merely a summons) and leave the action unpursued
so that they may say publicly that they are "suing the liars."
In recent years, however, some publishers have been confronted
with the defamation suit designed to force disclosure of confidential
sources. Such a suit is often brought by a public official or other
person who feels damaged by leaks, or "not-for-attribution" statements
made by persons with knowledge of the facts. Their objective is often
neither damages nor vindication, for the underlying material may well
be substantially true, but rather disclosure and punishment of the confidential source who may have performed a substantial public service
at risk to his employment or career.
The First Amendment protection available to a journalist accused
of defamation was thoroughly discussed in the 1958 case of Garland v.
Torre, 0 in an opinion written by then Circuit Judge Potter Stewart.
Marie Torre, a New York Herald Tribune correspondent, had described Judy Garland as overweight and attributed the description to
an unnamed CBS executive. During discovery, defendant Torre declined to identify her source. The court decided that the reporter would
have to answer if (a) the question was relevant, (b) alternative sources
had been exhausted, and (c) the inquiry went to the heart of the litigation. Because the Court found that the plaintiffs questions satisfied
these tests, the defendant was directed to answer, and upon her continued refusal, was jailed for contempt.
Recently in Carey v. Hume,31 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia required disclosure of a source used by Jack Anderson in
a column which had stated that the plaintiff, an attorney, and his client,
the United Mine Workers, had improperly taken records from the
UMW office. The court found that the identity of the appellant's
source was critical to the plaintiff's claim and compelled disclosure. A
contrary conclusion by the Eighth Circuit in Cervantes v. Time, Inc.3"
was distinguished on the ground that in Cervantes the court found that
there was no probability that the plaintiff would succeed in the defamation action in view of the extensive research conducted by the defendant publisher prior to the publication of the alleged defamatory
30. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
31. 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974).
32. 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.s. 1125 (1973).
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material. While Cervantes offers comfort to a defamation defendant
where the applicable standard of care has been satisfied, the Eighth
Circuit unfortunately found the question of privilege to be procedural
and thus declined to apply the New York "newsman's shield" statute,33
which had presumably been relied upon by the New York reporter who
prepared the article while in New York.
The traditional law of the forum approach, when applied to defamation cases, poses the same kind of problems for the national press
as those posed by the Supreme Court's abandonment of Rosenbloom,
i.e., the claimant may choose the forum least protective of the journalist, however small the circulation in that state. Thus a private plaintiff involved in a matter of public interest might well seek to assert
his claim in a state such as Kansas and presumably would avoid Indiana
or Colorado. Similarly, a defamation plaintiff whose objective is the
disclosure of confidential sources would make every effort to avoid
instituting the action in New York where the "newsman's shield" statute is the broadest, or in any other state that has adopted a strong
"newsman's shield" statute.
The choice of law alternatives were discussed recently in Apicella
v. McNeil Laboratories,Inc.,34 a medical malpractice action in which
the plaintiff sought the sources of a medical newsletter article which
had concluded that the drug "Innovar" was extremely dangerous. The
court indicated that the "center of gravity" approach for the choice
of law problem was appropriate, since all the contacts in Apicella were
in New York and the application of New York law was not contested.
Significantly, Judge Weinstein in Apicella decided that the First
Amendment interest in protecting the source outweighed the state's
interest in that information for the purposes of the malpractice litigation. In view of his decision not to compel disclosure, the judge precluded the use by either party during the course of the litigation of the
entire newsletter which had been published some two years after the
alleged malpractice.
A similar question of preclusion also arose in two defamation
lawsuits instituted by Brooklyn's Judge Rinaldi against The Village
Voice, Inc. and other defendants. The first suit 5 was based on an
33. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1975).
34. 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). See also Kaminsky, State Evidentiary Privileges in Federal Civil Litigation, 43 FoRDHAm L. REv. 923 (1975).
35. Rinaldi v. Village Voice, Inc., No. 8824/73 (Sup. Ct., New York County, N.Y.,
filed April 13, 1973).
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advertisement by The Village Voice in the New York Times, and the
second36 was based upon the republication of certain articles that
originally appeared in The Village Voice by Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. During the course of discovery in both proceedings, the plaintiff sought to obtain the names of the reporter's informants. The reporter refused to disclose his sources, citing the New York "newsman's shield" statute. In both actions the plaintiff moved to preclude
the defendants from introducing not only the names of witnesses whose
identities were kept confidential during discovery proceedings, but also
any evidence obtained from informants, notwithstanding the fact that
much of the material in question referred to interviews with unnamed
judges, prosecutors, and lawyers critical of the plaintiff. Significantly,
both motions were, in effect, denied, except that the defendant was
barred from calling the unidentified confidential sources as witnesses
or introducing their names at trial1 7 Both courts explicitly declined
to preclude the introduction of evidence obtained from those confidential sources.
Conclusion
While one is reluctant to reach dire conclusions from one or two
surprising decisions, the press must recognize the unfortunate trend of
increased hostility. Occasional judicial hostility to the press is apparent in related areas, such as the increasing issuance of gag orders,
the rigorous enforcement of subpoenas in criminal proceedings, and
even in the ever broader recognition of privacy claims. As a matter of
economics, however, it is the law of defamation that is most critical to
the survival of numerous newspapers and radio stations. The defamation questions of the next few years will test the very essence of the
First Amendment.

36. Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
York County, N.Y., filed Aug. 14, 1974).
37. Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
York County, N.Y.) (Preclusion Order, filed July
Inc., No. 8824/73 (Sup. CL, New York County,
31, 1975).

Ine., No. 12477/74 (Sup. Ct., New
Inc., No. 12477/74 (Sup. CL, New
31, 1975); Rinaldi v. Village Voice,
N.Y.) (Preclusion Order, filed Oct.

